Chevrolet builds T-17 Staghound armored scout cars in Flint, Mich., during World War II. Chevy built 3,800 Staghounds, most with the 37 mm cannons shown here, between October 1942 and April 1944. B-24s under construction at Ford’s Willow Run line. Civilian automobile manufacturing was curtailed during the war as the emphasis shifted to war production. Library of Congress photo Aircraft production 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total United States 2,141 6,068 19,433 47,836 85,898 96,318 46,001 303,695 Britain 7,940 15,049 20,094 23,672 26,263 26,461 12,070 131,549 Soviet Union 10,382 10,565 15,737 25,436 34,900 40,300 20,900 158,220 Germany 8,295 10,862 12,401 15,409 24,807 40,593 7,540 119,907 Japan 4,467 4,768 5,088 8,861 16,693 28180 8263 76320 Tank Production (1939-1945) United States 60,973 Soviet Union 54,500 Britain 23,202 Germany 19,926 Italy 4,600 Japan 2,464
It would be interesting to see the survival statistics of all tanks, planes and ships, for each year of the war. Those U.S. manufactured vehicles mostly didn't see action, until it was agreed to supply first Britain. Then, the Soviet Union. American forces didn't even use any of that equipment, before 1941. It's likely to have gone the direction of troop losses where the Soviets suffered a 10 to 1 casualty ratio. Those Sherman tanks were much smaller and simpler to build, using many less parts. It was like sending ants out to swarm the anteater and eventually kill it, through sheer numbers
The fact that M4 total production (I don't have the number off hand) was greater than Germany's total production of all AFVs, in itself, is pretty telling. When the U.S. began ramping up the Arsenal of Democracy, all the materiel made in the 1940-1941 time frame was approximately 40% Lend-Lease, 60% U.S. forces; as soon as war production ramped up, the percentages changed in Lend-Lease getting less of total production, but in terms of actual numbers, their share of U.S. production went up considerably.
As for the thoughts on tank design and production, it was true that taking out just one Panther, Tiger or Tiger II required a swarm of smaller tanks, and like in the movie Kelley's Heroes, as Oddball said, "Ya gotta hit 'em in the ass." Most German tanks destroyed in Russia were from tank destroyers with large-caliber guns, and vice-versa; most German tanks destroyed in France/Germany were simply put out of action by hitting the treads, or by getting behind the Germans and shooting the tank through the rear plate. With the Germans against all comers, their superior optics gave them a decided first-shot/first-kill advantage. We adapted the German optic design beginning with the M-47 Patton, and nowadays, with gyrostabilization, computerized tracking and the ability to shoot/kill while on the move at any speed, armored forces that get the first shots off have the decided advantage.
The Soviets adapted, with their T4s, which had enough caliber needed to pierce the Tiger's armor. Since the Germans never had to fight the Indians, they were never prepared for Guerilla Warfare which manifested itself in their failing to design in sealing their tanks better against direct man vs. tank tactics. Many, if not, most high-ranking officers were relics of an obsolete bygone military culture, dating back well into the previous century, many of them even having served during the previous world war fought from trenches. Then you have their overly-precise designed tanks which were designed to cover endless territory reliably, only under favorable conditions, whereas the Soviets designed theirs to cope with their harsh climate and lack of infrastructure, comparing the German's dilema with when M-16 rifles would fail, in Vietnam, because they were too precise for the terrain, while the enemy could drag their Kalaszhnikovs through the mud and they would still fire. Of course, it costed the Cong more rounds, since you could literally not be able to hit the broadside of a barn, as they used to say. But, at least, they weren't stuck out there without a functioning weapon